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ABSTRACT Over the last few decades, scientists have been busy debunking the
myth that nonhuman animals relate to each other in a primarily competitive, aggres-
sive way.What they have found is that many species of animal, including many of those
most closely related to humans, display a remarkable range of cooperative, “prosocial”
behavior. In fact, it appears that some animal societies adhere to a moral code.What is
preventing us, then, from saying that the members of these societies are moral beings?
Nothing important, according to a recent book. Probing further into this question, I
suggest that in fact quite a lot is at risk in making this move.To integrate nonhuman
animals fully into the moral domain, we may have to adapt our conception of moral-
ity in some very troublesome ways.
ARE ANY NONHUMANS moral beings?This, of course, depends on how“moralbeing” is defined.There isn’t a single correct definition of the term. Rather,
there are several eligible definitions, and which one we should use depends on
why we are asking the question. To illustrate the different purposes we might
have in asking this question, consider the following two extended versions of it:
•Are any nonhumans moral beings in the sense that it is possible for us to
have duties to them?
•Are any nonhumans moral beings in the sense that they are appropriate
objects of moral attitudes such as praise and blame?
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If we were out to answer the first version of the question, then we would define
“moral being” as “a being toward whom we can have duties,” and we would go
on to try to determine whether there are any animals (I will continue to omit
the “nonhuman” qualifier hereafter) that have whatever characteristics qualify a
being as an object of duties. If we were out to answer to the second version of
the question, then we would define “moral being” as “a being toward whom it
is appropriate to take moral attitudes,” and we would proceed to determine
whether there are any animals that have the characteristics that render a being
apt for moral judgment.
Either investigation would be well worth undertaking, and indeed both have
been undertaken.On the other hand, suppose someone proposed to try to deter-
mine whether any animals are moral beings, full stop.That is, they proposed to
answer the question for its own sake.We might have two worries, I think. First,
is this question compelling in itself, without being attached to an ulterior pur-
pose? Second, does the question have a right answer? As already mentioned, the
correct answer depends on how one defines “moral being,” and there doesn’t
appear to be a uniquely correct way to define the term.
In their extremely readable new book, Wild Justice, Mark Bekoff and Jessica
Pierce propose to answer the full-stop question. For their purposes, a moral
being is any being that behaves in a certain way (p. 5).The relevant kind of be-
havior, according to the authors, is “a suite of interrelated other-regarding behav-
iors that cultivate and regulate complex interactions within social groups” (p. 7).
More colloquially, moral behavior is behavior that is well-adapted for social liv-
ing (pp. 3, 45)—“social glue” (p. 7), they call it. Bekoff, an ethologist, and Pierce,
a philosopher, are out to show that several species of social mammals qualify as
moral beings.This includes, at least: great apes, wolves, coyotes, hyenas, dolphins,
whales, and some species of rodent and monkey (p. 9).
The bulk of Wild Justice is a fascinating review of the observational evidence
supporting the claim that these species of animal display the relevant kind of
behavior.Yet one might have thought that the empirical evidence could be left
aside in favor of a simple, mostly a priori argument: we know that great apes,
wolves, coyotes, etc., have been living in social groups for thousands of years.
Therefore, they must have behavioral adaptations that are conducive to social liv-
ing. Given the definition of “moral being” as a being that behaves in ways that
are conducive to life in a social group, it follows that the members of these
species are moral beings.
What, then, can we learn from the empirical evidence? Suppose that Bekoff
and Pierce wanted to define moral beings not just in terms of the end their be-
havior promotes (the success of societies) but also in terms of the mechanisms
they use to achieve that purpose.While we might be able to determine a priori
that the social mammals have adaptations conducive to social living, we cannot
determine a priori what those adaptations are. And indeed, Bekoff and Pierce are
determined to establish which behavioral mechanisms support the success of ani-
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mal societies.They dedicate a chapter apiece to each of three categories of behav-
ior—cooperative, empathic, and justice-promoting—arguing convincingly that
humans are not the only ones who display these kinds of behavior. Perhaps, then,
“moral being” is to be defined as a being that displays a suite of cooperative,
empathic, and justice-promoting behaviors that promotes the success of its soci-
ety. At times, Bekoff and Pierce seem to want to go this route (pp. 1, 138, 148).
However, this would appear to be an arbitrary move (why exclude some of
the behaviors that promote societal success?), and, in any event, most of the tex-
tual evidence indicates that Bekoff and Pierce do not want their definition of
“moral being” to include particular kinds of behavior. In particular, such a defi-
nition would be in tension with their move away from moral universalism in
favor of species-relativism (pp. 19, 139, 147–48). (This is a well-motivated move
in the context of Wild Justice, as I explain below.) Actually, their official position
is that morality is society-relative, since there are often variations within species
in what behaviors make different societies successful (p. 20). In any event, there
wouldn’t be much room left for any kind of relativism at all if “moral being”
were defined as a being that displays a suite of cooperative, empathic, and jus-
tice-promoting behaviors that promotes the success of its society. Ultimately,
then, we should interpret Bekoff and Pierce as defining “moral being” in terms
of the end its behavior serves.Therefore, whether animals behave empathically,
cooperatively, or justly is beside the point.Yes, we humans recognize such behav-
ior as moral behavior, but since morality is society-relative, our judgments are
neither here nor there.
Thus, for all its talk about empathy, cooperation, and justice, Wild Justice actu-
ally makes quite a weak point: many social mammals engage in behaviors that
are conducive to the success of the societies they live in.Thus, these animals are
moral beings, because morality is a set of behaviors that are conducive to the suc-
cess of a social group.
Does this conception of morality leave out anything important? Certainly it
puts pressure on our long-standing tendency to conceive of ourselves as moral
beings in a more robust sense than applies to any other kind of animal. Bekoff
and Pierce are aware of this (pp. 137–42), and they encourage their readers to
adopt an attitude of openness and critical reflection on the nature of morality. In
that spirit, I propose to examine, in the remainder of this essay, some of the ways
in which the proposed conception of morality might be seen as deficient. As
mentioned at the outset, I don’t think that there is a uniquely correct way to
define “moral being,” and the same may well hold for “morality.” It would be
good, however, to at least have a grip on what is at stake in choosing our defi-
nitions. Since Bekoff and Pierce are offering a normative account of morality (p.
148)—that is, they are trying to say something about the nature of morality itself,
as opposed to saying something merely about how it is practiced in different
societies—we should expect their account of morality to have substantive impli-
cations about right and wrong.
13_53.4sachs 624–29:15_51.3avise 484–  8/30/10  7:40 AM  Page 626
Morality, Adapted
autumn 2010 • volume 53, number 4 627
One thing that is at stake is the moral status of intergroup relations. If the
moral norms are the norms that allow groups to flourish, then it is difficult to
see what grounds we might have for condemning malevolent behavior between
members of distinct groups. For instance,we believe that there are moral and im-
moral ways to treat foreign tourists. Can a society-relative morality account for
this?Yes, if it can be established that we are all members of a global society.Given
the presence of global economic and communications systems, it seems plausi-
ble to suppose that we are.
More troubling, perhaps, is the status of interspecific relations.We believe that
our treatment of animals, at least some of them, is subject to moral assessment.
Yet surely they are not members of our society. (Actually, it has been argued that
some animals are; seeWarren 2000.) Bekoff and Pierce claim that their book has
no particular implications for how humans ought to treat animals (pp. 149–50).
This, it turns out, may well not be true. On the contrary, it appears the concep-
tion of morality that they advocate has the implication that we may permissibly
do whatever we want to animals.
Should we then entirely abandon that conception? If the only alternative
were to say that moral norms are universal, then we would appear to be stuck
between a rock and a hard place.We don’t want to hold animals to all the norms
that we use to maintain social order, some of which would be patently ridicu-
lous when applied to the animal kingdom (sexual norms come to mind). Simi-
larly, we don’t want to hold ourselves to all the norms that structure successful
animal societies, such as fixed, inherited hierarchies. So universality is out of the
question.Yet we don’t want to license any and all interspecific behavior.Thus,
strict society-relativism is out of the question too. Perhaps, however, there is a
middle way. Bekoff and Pierce are at pains to emphasize that although animals
clearly have the capacity for cruelty, they are rarely cruel, even with respect to
members of other species (pp. 17–18). Why not say, then, that amidst all the
species-relative norms there is a universal norm opposing cruelty? This would
commit us to saying that when a chimp, wolf or dolphin behaves cruelly, it
thereby behaves immorally.Yet this seems like a reasonable price to pay to pay,
and in fact Bekoff and Pierce are willing to pay it (pp. 15–16). Our conception
of morality would then be neither entirely universal nor entirely society-relative.
This hybrid view wouldn’t prohibit us from killing animals, but it would pro-
hibit us from being cruel to them.This, surely, is an improvement over the any-
thing-goes approach.
Another important consequence of any behavior-based conception of moral-
ity is the consequent diminishment of the importance of moral reasoning.We
tend to think that moral beings are those beings that have the capacity to delib-
erate about moral norms, as opposed to just those beings whose behavior hap-
pens to conform to them.Bekoff and Pierce are not willing to go this far, though
they do make some concessions in this direction (p. 13) that allow them to main-
tain that bees, for instance, do not qualify as moral beings. It is not clear to me
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what is to be gained by this compromise. It’s true that under normal circum-
stances it would be odd to say that bees are moral beings, but the counterintu-
itiveness of this claim melts away if we stipulate the truth of a behavior-based
conception of morality.
Finally, the proposition that morality is a set of behaviors conducive to the
success of social groups invites a reconsideration of various substantive issues in
moral theory. For instance, behavior that conforms to the norms of etiquette
seems to qualify as moral behavior under this conception. Philippa Foot (1972)
famously argued that there was no distinction in reason-giving force between
moral norms and norms of etiquette; both kinds of norm are “hypothetical,”
meaning that they provide reasons only for those who subscribe to the broader
system of which they are a part. In the last few decades the holy grail for moral
philosophers has been an argument that could demonstrate that while norms of
etiquette are indeed hypothetical,moral norms are categorical (i.e., they apply to
everyone who can understand them). Wild Justice might be taken to suggest that
both Foot and her interlocutors have it wrong, and that the truth is that both
sets of norms are categorical. Bekoff and Pierce, for their part, seem to suggest
that for animals, this may be the case (p. 15).
One might also wonder whether linking morality to the success of societies
illicitly sneaks in a form of utilitarianism without argument. Now one might
respond, “What moral theory opposes the success of society?” There is some
truth to this response, but only so much.There are moral extremists, and though
they are extremists, some argument needs to be mustered in opposition to them.
Kant (1797) was such an extremist, insisting that one should never tell a lie, no
matter what the consequences.And there are other, less extreme, moral theories
that do not sit comfortably with societal success as the ultimate goal of moral-
ity. Consider a famous thought experiment by H. J. McCloskey (1972). Suppose
the only way to prevent a riot was to falsely accuse, imprison, and execute an in-
nocent person.The mob wants to see justice done, and they can be fooled into
thinking it has been done, if only you will get your hands dirty. By doing the
deed, you will prevent a much greater amount of harm-doing—property
destruction, assault, even killing—than you will engage in. Should you do it? It
seems to me that there are a number of reasonable, non-extreme moral theories
that would answer “no.”Can we allow for the coherence of such views this while
saying that morality is a set of norms conducive to the success of society? It’s not
clear to me that we can.
In the face of this problem,we might retreat to a weaker position, insisting only
that moral norms are norms governing the distribution of harms and benefits,
while not presupposing that the success of society is the ultimate goal. (Bekoff and
Pierce seem to endorse this view on p. 14.) But even this moral conception seems
to immediately rule out certain reasonable moral views, such as T. M. Scanlon’s
(1998) view, on which morality in the first instance is about being able to justify
one’s actions to others.
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Of course Bekoff and Pierce have as much license as anyone else to take up a
substantive position in moral theory, and utilitarianism is certainly a position to
be taken seriously. However, if we insist that moral norms function to promote
the success of societies, then we face a problem more profound than whatever
problems face utilitarianism: we risk misrepresenting the very essence of moral-
ity. Consider another thought experiment. Suppose that all humans voluntarily
joined the same ascetic religion that prohibits reproduction.Would there be any
wrongdoing here? If we abandon the connection between morality and the suc-
cess of societies, then the answer must be “no.”And indeed, this strikes me as the
right answer. As Joel Feinberg (1980)—the originator of this thought experi-
ment—claims, a collective decision to end the human species would be a trag-
edy and a sign of our biological unsuitability for survival, but it would not be
immoral. The same, I would say, holds for other species. This suggests that the
success of societies, far from being the sine qua non of morality, is in fact morally
optional.
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